One contribution of 23 to a theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'. Numerical knowledge, including number concepts and arithmetic procedures, seems to be a clear-cut case for abstract symbol manipulation. Yet, evidence from perceptual and motor behaviour reveals that natural number knowledge and simple arithmetic also remain closely associated with modal experiences. Following a review of behavioural, animal and neuroscience studies of number processing, we propose a revised understanding of psychological number concepts as grounded in physical constraints, embodied in experience and situated through task-specific intentions. The idea that number concepts occupy a range of positions on the continuum between abstract and modal conceptual knowledge also accounts for systematic heuristics and biases in mental arithmetic, thus inviting psycho-logical approaches to the study of the mathematical mind.
The epistemological status of number concepts
Why do numbers offer a promising perspective for experimental investigation of abstract conceptual knowledge? By contrast to words, natural number concepts (1, 2, etc.) permit better stimulus control for length and frequency effects on behaviour, they have clearer denotations and (normally) lack connotations, and they come with a fairly homogeneous and tractable acquisition history. Moreover, their manipulation involves clear semantic relations and known quantitative differences, allowing for excellent experimental control over the relationships between them. Yet numbers are crucially relevant for a wide range of everyday behaviours. These are attractive qualities from a researcher's point of view which should make numbers the preferred material for the study of conceptual representation. We, therefore, review representative performance patterns with numbers in order to document a change in perspective about natural number concepts and also to promote their wider use as a testbed for knowledge representations generally.
Numbers are thought of as abstract concepts not only by logicians and mathematicians interested in formal foundations of logical thought [1, 2] but also by psycho-logical theoreticians because quantity-specific experiences vary arbitrarily when we enumerate sets of objects: three apples, three cars, three flowers or three sounds may differ across all sensory modalities. The set size as an 'abstracted feature' seems sufficiently removed from sensory experience to support precise numeration and calculation independent of context. Behavioural studies with human infants [3] and animals [4] , supplemented by neuronal recordings and brain imaging data [5, 6] , provide vast support for the view that our brains have evolved to abstract numerosity both within and across sensory modalities. Under certain circumstances, number estimation performance in human adults is very similar to that of infants and animals [7] , demonstrating the use of abstract and notation-independent number concepts. Thus, primitive neural processes, such as number-specific neuronal tuning, provide a foundation for symbolic numerical development in the human brain: together with appropriate cultural guidance, these phylogenetic predispositions enable children to acquire verbal counting, the meaning of Arabic numerals and written number words, as well as elementary arithmetic in just six years [8, 9] . In fact, this ability to manipulate entirely abstract quantities may be the very foundation of culture [10, 11] . Consequently, our ability to masterfully manipulate number symbols might be understood through its implementation on mechanical or digital computing devices.
Yet, closer inspection of counting reveals several sensory and also motor patterns which establish natural numbers as embodied concepts. Briefly ( [12] for detail), more objects tend to take up more space along all cardinal axes, so processing them requires spatially-distributed attention and establishes numerical associations along the three spatial and one temporal dimension. Everyone learns that 'more is up' [13] and people raised in Western cultures learn that increasingly larger number names are associated with increasingly more rightsided actions [14, 15] , either due to brain asymmetry [16] or from observational learning [17] . Similarly, our ability to distinguish perceptual numerosities is governed by Weber's law (the just-noticeable difference between sets increases with set size) and this performance signature is preserved with symbolic quantities (i.e. discriminating two digits' meanings [18] ). Moreover, the physical fact that more objects tend to take up more space leads to systematic everyday experiences. For example, once a minimal, subitizable (immediately quantitatively appreciable) set size is exceeded, we frequently use temporally extended behaviours which correlate with numerosity, such as counting. Counting constitutes verbal sensory-motor routines to establish one-to-one correspondences between objects and number names until each object (or group) has been referenced once and the last number name establishes set size or cardinality [19] . Fingers are universal means of associating the spatial, visual, kinesthetic and proprioceptive body signals with number names [20] [21] [22] . Thus, whenever we interact with quantities, systematically correlated multi-modal sensory-motor experiences accompany the use of natural number concepts. While there may be a preferred link between numbers and hands [23, 24] , a formal assessment akin to that for other concepts [25] is currently missing. Nevertheless, everyday experiences involving numbers establish sensory-motor foundations for several performance signatures in symbolic numerical cognition, three of which we will now discuss.
Cognitive signatures of natural numbers
The processing of natural number symbols is characterized by several systematic performance signatures. We review three of them briefly to motivate a theoretical claim about the nature of number concepts ( [26] for wider review). First, when we compare two number symbols in order to decide which symbol refers to the larger magnitude, we do so more rapidly and with fewer errors when the numerical distance between the two symbol meanings is larger. Thus, the comparison between 3 and 4 is harder than the comparison between 3 and 9. This so-called numerical distance effect may seem surprising when we consider that we have activated neighbouring conceptual representations in the first case and relatively distant representations in the latter case. Yet the problem is not one of rapid activation but one of reliable discrimination: given that adjacent (similar) semantic representations tend to overlap more with one another, their relative magnitude difference seems harder to establish compared to more distant number pairs. It is noteworthy that this dominant account of the numerical distance effect in terms of representational overlap relies on the spatial analogy of a 'mental number line' (MNL) to convey the notion of similarity along the magnitude dimension. More specifically, it instantiates an analogue medium to convey graded differences in symbol meaning.
The numerical distance effect was originally found in the magnitude comparison task [18, 27] but generalizes to other behavioural tasks, such as same-different judgements [28, 29] and priming tasks [30] and also to the neuronal level [31] [32] [33] . This robust phenomenon was found with various stimulus formats [34] , it persists despite extensive practice [35] and is evident both across cultures [36] and age groups ( [37] , reviews in [38] [39] [40] ). With non-symbolic stimuli, numerical distance effects were also obtained in different species (fish [41] ; monkeys [32, [42] [43] [44] ). For a review of numerical distance effects in pigeons and chimpanzees, see Dehaene et al. [45] .
A second fundamental signature of numerical cognition is the size effect: even with numerical distance held constant, decisions about which of two number symbols refers to the larger magnitude depend on their meaning. The comparison between 3 and 4 will typically be easier than the comparison between 8 and 9. Again, theoretical accounts for this size effect rely on the notion of conceptual overlap on a MNL: a linear account states that all numbers are equally spaced along this line but larger numbers have wider internal distributions; this increasing imprecision leads to larger conceptual overlap with their neighbours and thus makes it more difficult to determine their magnitude difference. A logarithmic account postulates instead that all number representations are equally precise but their distances are logarithmically compressed, in analogy with the perceptual representation of all sensory continua [46] . While neurocognitive evidence from single-cell recordings favours the logarithmic claim [47] and thus indirectly establishes a sensory foundation for number concepts, more direct evidence from behavioural tasks such as number-to-position mapping [48] or magnitude matching with arms or fingers [49] supports instead a linear hypothesis about the structure of our MNL. Note that the linear account preserves the intuitive idea that all consecutive numerical distances are identical. We will discuss this conspicuous recurrence to spatial and thus sensory-motor experiences as part of our reasoning about the nature of number representations further below.
The size effect also generalizes across tasks, including arithmetic operations, with longer response times for larger problems (e.g. 7 þ 1 versus 3 þ 1). It is, however, not clear whether this problem-size effect has the same origin as the original size effect [50, 51] . While the brain processes larger numbers on the basis of language-specific rules such as place-value associations and inversion [52] , advanced mathematical expertise seems to recur to core number processing areas instead of linguistic structures [53] . Similar to the distance effect, the size effect was found with various stimulus formats [34] , is evident across age groups ( [54] , reviews in [38, 40] ) as well as across different species ( [41, 43, 55] ; reviews in [45, 51] ). Interestingly, comparing across cultures not only confirms the pervasiveness of the problem-size effect [36] but also indicates that different learning histories lead to different brain activations, with more premotor activation in Chinese compared to English adults possibly reflecting the formers' use of manual calculation aids known as abaci [56, 57] .
The metaphor of a mental number line, introduced by Restle [27] to account for both size and distance effects with a rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 373: 20170125 single and elegant claim, has become a powerful construct in the field of numerical cognition. Irrespective of any commitment to either a linear or a logarithmic metric, researchers are willing to accept the implied recurrence to space and spatial order when discussing the cognitive representation of numerical symbol meanings. Thus, it seemed intuitive to imbue the MNL with a further spatial characteristic, namely a fixed orientation in space, when it was observed that small numbers are preferentially associated with left space and larger numbers are preferentially associated with right space. This observation [58, 59] has become a third core signature of number knowledge, today known as spatial-numerical association (SNA). The behavioural signature has been taken to indicate that smaller numbers are cognitively represented to the left of larger numbers, which then explains the observable SNAs as instances of a spatial compatibility effect where responses are faster and less error-prone when mentally coded stimulus locations and physically instantiated motor responses share a spatial code such as 'left' or 'right' [60] . It also explains systematic co-occurrence of spatial and numerical deficits in brain-damaged patients, some of whom ignore both left space and smaller numbers [61, 62] .
Similar to the other signature effects of numerical cognition, SNAs were repeatedly found with various stimulus formats, cognitive tasks and measurement methods, as well as with different responses (hands, eyes, feet, head; reviews in [63, 64] ). There are neural signatures of SNAs [65, 66] and SNAs were documented across ages [67] [68] [69] and across species [70, 71] . Moreover, SNAs were recently found in newborn chicks [16] as well as in human newborns [72] , which strengthens the hypothesis that the spatial association of number knowledge is a universal innate feature of the cognitive system. In summary, these three signature effects are robust and relevant for any theory of numerical cognition. At the same time, they can also be taken to indicate that number concepts are grounded as descriptors of the physical world, embodied through sensory-motor experiences and situated in their sensitivity to task requirements. Thus, we will now argue against the traditional idea of number concepts as occupying an extreme position on the continuum between abstract and modal knowledge.
Against pure abstraction of number
We begin our argument with a focus on spatial-numerical associations. Importantly for our case, SNAs are bi-directional at both the sensory and motor levels: the sensory association was documented by faster detection of left-side probes following the central presentation of small numbers [73, 74] and by faster processing of small numbers after left-side attentional cueing [75, 76] . The motor association was demonstrated by faster left-side movements following small number presentation and more frequent left-side responding following small number production [77, 78] . Similar associations hold for larger numbers and right space, as was extensively reviewed by Fischer and colleagues [63, 64] . These obligatory and bidirectional links suffice to argue that numbers are embodied concepts. The findings also suggest that our cognitive system uses magnitude cues to predict sensory and motor processing.
Associations between number magnitude and space are not limited to the horizontal dimension. Winter et al. [79] 
back space and larger numbers with far or front space in a wide range of behavioural tasks. Whether these orthogonal SNAs imply distinct and orthogonal MNLs is unclear; the mere question seems to dilute the conceptual power of the MNL metaphor as an explanans for the cognitive signatures of number processing. In any event, the multidirectional nature of SNAs argues against a single mapping mechanism and points to a strong influence of situation-specific factors governing the retrieval of number knowledge.
The situational sensitivity of number concepts is documented by evidence from within a single spatial dimension. We focus on reading-related tasks and consider first the horizontal dimension. Most SNA studies were conducted with Western participants who read both numbers and words from left to right. Given our perspective on numbers as embodied concepts it is informative to check whether other systematic sensorymotor habits modulate these SNAs. Importantly, whenever adults from a right-to-left reading culture were tested, smaller or reverse SNAs were demonstrated. Specifically, congruent reading direction experiences for numbers and for words leads to clear SNAs in the same direction [80] . However, mixed reading habits for numbers and words, as exist in Hebrew, lead to no overt horizontal SNAs [80] [81] [82] . A recent study seems to contradict this general pattern because the temporal separation of the assessments with two response rules, needed to quantify SNAs in the parity judgement task, seems to dissipate this conflict [83] . Also recently, we found that the direction of SNAs may be imposed at a pre-literate stage as it was dependent on object counting habits [84] . Even children with little (or apparently no) reading experience show spatial biases in object counting and random number generation tasks [17, 85, 86] .
Is the habitual reading direction the only factor influencing SNAs? Indeed, if no other recent spatial experience is available, the well-established and embodied reading direction may be the major factor for spatial mapping of numbers. However, a series of studies demonstrated the crucial role of recent situation-dependent spatial experiences: a few minutes of reading in either a left-to-right (Russian) or a right-to-left (Hebrew) script modulated SNAs in bilingual participants ( [87] ; see [17] for similar modulation of SNAs in children after reading observation). The striking flexibility of horizontal SNAs was highlighted by the findings that the mere presentation of a single Russian or Hebrew number word is enough to change the SNA of the subsequent digit [88] . Finally, even during reading in a given direction, the position of numbers appearing in the text modulates SNAs, demonstrating again the power of recent experiences over spatial mapping of numbers [89] . Here the intention to learn the quantities overruled the pre-experimental SNAs.
Consider now the evidence from within the vertical spatial dimension to further illustrate the situated nature of number concepts. Interestingly, vertical SNAs are apparently unrelated to reading direction: top-to-bottom Japanese readers, as well as left-to-right German readers and right-to-left Hebrew readers, associated small numbers with a lower response button and large numbers with an upper response button ( [82, 90, 91] , review in [79] -but see [92] ). This spatial-numerical association is contrary to reading direction of Japanese readers and unrelated to reading direction of German and Hebrew readers, rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 373: 20170125 indicating a possible role of other factors in vertical SNAs, such as the universal metaphor of 'more is up' [13, 93] , whereby larger quantities tend to generate taller piles.
These findings pertaining to horizontal and vertical SNAs during reading amply document that numbers are nonabstract concepts. This view is further corroborated by evidence from other SNAs, as well as the size and distance effects which we can only briefly discuss. Consider first the distance effect, that is, that smaller numerical distances are harder to resolve than larger numerical distances. Clearly, this would not be expected if the mind were merely a symbol comparator because all number symbols are about equally different from each other (but see [94] ). Instead, the graded increase in discriminability for semantically less similar number pairs seems to reflect a perception-like quality: numbers become more similar because the underlying conceptual representations become more similar. This explanation assumes that the comparison is not performed on the symbols themselves but on their underlying quantity dimension, as if each symbol would evoke an image of an amorphous quantity. Similarly, the size effect seems to reflect number symbols' ability to evoke amorphous quantities: symbols such as 8 and 9 might evoke two relatively large quantities while symbols 3 and 4 evoke substantially smaller quantities. Given the Weber law of perceptual discriminability we would then expect the observed performance difference. Thus, our minds obligatorily refer back to the sensory modalities within which number concepts were first experienced [24] , similarly to the mandatory mental rotation that occurs when we compare two misaligned objects [95, 96] .
To be clear, this evidence does not reject the view that our brains can compute and manipulate abstract set size properties, too. Thus, we do not wish to mix up the pure number concept with constraints imposed on cognition from either neural or environmental statistics. After all, we have developed various abstract symbolic systems to overcome limitations of analogue quantity representations, foremost among them linguistic labels to precisely denote arbitrarily large quantities. Yet, these linguistic structures introduce other systematic biases (reviewed in [52] ). Perhaps we can liken the quantitative brain to an interactive chimera, its modern part running complex computations while its primitive part performs approximate assessments of quantity [8] .
A hierarchical proposal
The current discussion about abstract versus modal representations [97, 98] can benefit from a terminological clarification. Specifically, it has repeatedly been noted that the concepts 'grounded' and 'embodied' are used interchangeably in the literature. Moreover, labels such as 'situated' or 'extended' cognition have entered the debate, often without clear definitions [99] . Based on our above review of empirical evidence from number concepts we propose, and suggest to use more widely in further discussion, a distinction between three hierarchically related levels of knowledge representation on the basis of their sensitivity to physical facts, sensory-motor experiences and intentionality manipulations [100, 101] . This view is summarized in table 1. The first and most fundamental level of knowledge 'grounding' is expressed in our bodies as a result of their biological origin: millennia of evolution have shaped our anatomy and nervous systems in ways that optimize our survival. We are built to withstand the constant pull of gravity in a world where objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time [103] . This latter constraint on cognition explains the association between more and up [90, 91] that is reflected in universal metaphorical descriptions [13, 93] . Moving from the descriptive to the interactive level of 'embodiment' proper, we must acknowledge the impact of idiosyncratic learning experiences on knowledge representation, such as hand dominance [104, 105] , lateralization of finger counting preferences [21, 106] and habitual reading direction [80] as described above. These factors shape knowledge acquisition and retrieval differently for different individuals, consistent with the key concepts of embodied cognition: re-enactment or motor resonance [97, 107] . Finally, intentional acts organize any knowledge in task-appropriate ways, leading to efficient retrieval regardless of pre-existing associative spatial-numerical experiences. Two examples of this situation-specificity of SNAs from outside the reading context are (i) the numbers 4 and 5 being associated with either left or right space, depending on the stimulus range [59, 108] and (ii) the association of small numbers with left or right space, depending on their interpretation as lengths on a ruler or times on a clock face [102] .
This terminological clarification helps us to organize the empirical evidence and to generate predictions for further tests. If all knowledge is grounded then idiosyncratic differences in numeracy emerge at the embodied level of knowledge representation and empirical studies that systematically manipulate participants' learning history operate at the level of embodied knowledge [87] while those that change the task instructions are manipulating participants' intentions [109] . Studies of knowledge grounding require manipulations of physical laws such as gravity [85, 110] . Finally, when pitted against each other, situated manipulations likely generate the strongest effects while grounded knowledge should be relatively resistant to change.
A practical perspective
We end our review by pointing to the practical relevance of an embodied perspective on number concepts. There is currently a flurry of observations that extend the claim of horizontal SNAs from single number processing into the realm of mental arithmetic. First, there is a tendency to accept larger than the correct outcomes following an addition operation, and smaller than the correct outcome after subtractions [111] [112] [113] . Secondly, there is a tendency to point more rightward after additions and more leftward after subtractions (spatial operational momentum-OM; [114, 115] ). And finally, addition and subtraction operations lead to enhanced perceptual sensitivity in the right and left side of space, respectively [116] [117] [118] [119] . But also outside of SNAs, there are clear links between sensorymotor activities and arithmetic biases, such as making and breaking sets inducing addition and subtraction biases, respectively [120] . These biases again point to systematic motor and sensory associations, now between symbol manipulation procedures in the mind and apparently extraneous bodily signals. Together with evidence from bi-directional cross-domain priming [121] and from perceptual effects on algebraic reasoning and vice versa [122, 123] , these findings call into question the received view of arithmetic reasoning as a pinnacle of rationality and an example par excellence for abstract symbol manipulation. Instead, mental arithmetic follows a long list of heuristics and biases, just as much of our other rational thoughts [124, 125] . We have recently interpreted these new developments in the arithmetic heuristics and biases (AHAB) model [113] designed to explain systematic violations of the formal axioms of arithmetic. Briefly, we propose that OM reflects at least three different and competing mechanisms of numerical cognition: a more-or-less heuristic, a sign-space association and-consistent with fundamental insights into quantitative reasoning-an anchoring bias. The more-or-less heuristic reflects universally consistent daily-life experiences of making and breaking of sets, where additions create larger outcomes and subtractions smaller outcomes [93, 112] . This heuristic expresses grounded knowledge as defined above. The sign-space association captures culturally mediated learned associations of addition signs with right space and subtraction signs with left space [114, 115, 126] . This association captures the embodied level of knowledge. Finally, the anchoring bias captures the fact that the first operand of arithmetic problems must be larger in subtractions than in additions if result sizes are matched across operations. This anchoring experience captures a momentary and situated effect but also expresses a statistical regularity which tends to induce a psychological bias by initially activating larger number concepts in the context of subtraction compared to addition [124] and subsequently affects both estimation and calculation behaviour. The weighted combination of these three mechanisms in AHAB accounts for much of the OM literature and correctly predicts reverse OM as a result of anchoring [113, 127] . More generally, the model signals that a psycho-logical formalization of number concepts is essential in order to account for the patterns of human mental arithmetic.
In conclusion, recent work on biases in numerical cognition has made clear that our number knowledge differs from that of a calculator. The human mind is not a computer but a coordinator between perception and action. Therefore, sensory-motor associations pervade all domains of knowledge, including even the supposedly abstract domain of numerical cognition. This argument challenges Frege's [1] reductionist claim that psychology has nothing to contribute to the foundation of arithmetic, a view informed by the then prevalent subjectivist approach to mental life. Chronometric, developmental, crosscultural and neuroscientific evidence instead converges on the conclusion that a behaviourally relevant understanding of number knowledge must allow for a broader positioning of number concepts along the continuum from abstract to concrete (or modal) representations [24, 128] . While it is true that number knowledge can be a mathematical abstraction, our minds treat numbers just like any other conceptual knowledge by recurring to specific sensory-motor experiences. Novel approaches are needed to better understand the embodied nature of number knowledge in order to devise the most appropriate methods for training and rehabilitation of the numerical mind. One promising venue for further work is the field of developmental robotics which combines computational approaches to embodiment [129, 130] with training studies of biologically plausible learning algorithms in humanoid robots [131] [132] [133] . Building embodied calculators thus reconciles abstract and modal interpretations of number.
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